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Abstract: This paper deals with the organization of simulation exercises to train 
organizations to face emergencies. The original objective of simulations is to train people to 
emergency procedures and devices; we raise the question of training people to face 
potential crisis situations: are simulations fitted to that objective? Through the observation 
of a number of exercises by private companies and rescue services, we can answer that 
naïve interpretation of simulation results limits their benefits to the correction of gaps 
between prescribed and observed actions, without addressing complex organizational 
behavior. We introduce a method to organize simulations that gives access to this 
complexity and to the resilience capacities of the organization by giving specific roles to 
observers. This method uses a model of the organization seen as a combination of 
structures, relations and meaning. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the growing complexity of technological and organizational systems, companies 
and public bodies have recently developed simulations, exercises and drills in order to 
train their staff to face hazardous situations. 
These simulations are related to emergency plans: dangerous situations or critical 
phenomena that have been identified as potential threats are played out and analyzed 
with the aim to define prevention and protection measures and to set up intervention 
plans. Exercise scenarios give people opportunities to “play the game” in realistic 
conditions, practice plans and test the use of technological devices. 
Our observations and analysis of such simulations (toxic leak in a refinery, fire in a road 
tunnel, terrorist attack in the metro, etc.) have shown the benefits but also the limitations 
in terms of lessons (behaviors, decision making) learned by participants. 
Among the benefits, the setting up of the exercise is in itself a good opportunity to 
gather the many stakeholders and to discuss “who is in charge of what”; this facilitates 
mutual knowledge among technical staff and shared values in the different 
organizations. The second kind of benefit is the test in quasi-real conditions of the 
technological devices and means (medical tents, fire extinction means, communications, 
etc.) and their use. 
Among the limitations, the poor level of realism of the simulation is often an obstacle to 
the commitment of participants, who don’t react as they would in a real, stressful 
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 situation. Another limitation lies in the evaluation method; people are evaluated for their 
strict application of plans, compared to “official” plans and procedures. Any difference 
in behavior is seen as a violation of rules and sanctioned or at least pointed to as an 
error, which strongly reduces people's willingness to innovate. 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that simulations are efficient in creating 
opportunities for people to work together and to improve their practice of plans and 
procedures. But do simulations improve the ability of organizations to avoid or manage 
crises? Based on different non-participant observations and in-depth interviews, our 
answer is “no", to the extent that their analysis is limited to the identification of 
deviations from the norm. 
Wybo (2004) defines a crisis as a situation in which an organization is overwhelmed 
and destabilized, as compared with emergency management, a situation in which the 
organization remains in control, applying known plans and procedures. In this context, 
resilience is the ability of the organization (at any level) to remain under control when 
faced to hazardous situations, uncertainty, time pressure and threats, from outside and 
inside. 
In observing simulations, we have identified individual and collective reactions to 
difficulties that were not foreseen in the emergency plans. When faced with 
unanticipated events or situations, some people (generally the most experienced) 
emerge from the group, commit themselves to “do something” and find innovations and 
adaptations of plans to cope with the real situation. In some situations, new 
organizational patterns emerge, for example the creation of new communication flows 
or an alternate distribution of tasks. With such actions, these individuals and groups 
demonstrate their capacity to contribute to a higher level of resilience in the 
organization. 
In order to go further in this reflection, we have designed a method to observe and 
analyze simulation exercises, allowing the identification of such behaviors, the context 
in which they appear and the lessons that can be learned from this analysis in terms of 
resilience capacities.  
2 THE ROLE OF SIMULATIONS 
2.1 Safety management and risk perception 
It is now widely accepted that safety management inside the organization has to 
consider, in addition to the physical characteristics of dangers in the working place, the 
way risks are perceived by those involved. Broadly defined, the study of risk perception 
inside organizations deals with the comprehension of tasks and the definition of the 
working situation when these may constitute a threat for the physical integrity of 
personnel, installations security, and even the safety and health of populations outside 
the organization. 
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 Taking risk perception into account can be considered as one remedy for "normal 
accidents" as suggested by Weick (1986) who shows that systems vulnerable to normal 
accidents (Perrow, 1984) are at the same time contexts where individuals try to 
understand and manage complexity. Weick suggests preventive and learning actions 
through which individuals and groups become able to build elaborated interpretations of 
what they do and experience, leading them to analyze events other than those strictly 
limited to technical matters. Jacques & al. (1999) have shown, using cognitive mapping, 
the evolution of learning over time by using preventive learning technique.  
The challenge is thus for the organization to integrate safety management in two 
manners: first by taking into account human and organizational and not only technical 
factors of safety, and second, through involving fully all the actors inside the 
organization. When the risk of accident concerns outside populations, a wide array of 
actors can be involved.  
Safety integration can be achieved through training and preventive actions. A second 
way is through simulation. The specific advantage of simulation as a source of lessons 
is that it puts forward many aspects of what people prefer not to think about in their 
everyday working life situation: an accident. In terms of perception, a simulated 
accident makes manifest events which otherwise might remain unknown, unseen and 
unheard of.  
The simulation of a large accident involves many different actors whose role is to 
intervene in case of accident. In normal times, these actors do not meet nor are they part 
of the high reliability organization. In the case of accident, they must cooperate and 
coordinate themselves. This very fact is in itself a complex organizational achievement, 
costly in terms of material and human resource mobilization. 
Under normal operations, it is the occurrence of the accident that triggers a wide array 
of events, ranging from the focus of attention of personnel to the calling together of 
many outside actors. The accident has the upper hand. In the case of simulation, it is the 
human mind that takes the lead. What difference does this make? This is what we aim to 
distinguish here, principally in terms of learning, which is chief among the resilience 
capacities of organizations. 
Put simply, one can say that simulation creates for the organization an intermediate state 
between normal operations and crisis situations. While some of the preparedness 
required to face potential crisis situations can be acquired during normal times, other 
levels of learning can be acquired only outside normal situations, i.e. during crisis or 
simulation situations. 
We focus in this paper on learning during simulation situations. To understand the 
dynamics of this type of learning, we have to consider some aspects of safety 
management in ordinary times. How safety is recovered during and after a crisis can 
then be examined on that basis. 
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 2.2 Safety management in normal times and during crisis 
When a safety issue is raised, one may observe that everyone in the organization has an 
opinion on the question. While the starting point of this opinion is the shared objective 
to avoid accidents and prevent operational errors, reasoning and references, often 
implicit, may rapidly diverge. This can occur according to the position and role of the 
actor, his knowledge of risks and operations, possible defensive mechanisms linked to 
his profession (Dejours, 2000), orientations set by the hierarchy and the top 
management, etc. 
In addition, the perceived contradiction between the a priori shared goal of a high level 
of safety and secondary divergences, can lead to misunderstandings or stalled situations, 
which in turn are counterproductive for safety. The extent and efficiency of preventive 
actions, as well as communication with stakeholders, thus can suffer. 
Organizations are bound by many levels of requirement or obligation in regard to safety 
assurance (Poumadère and Mugnai, 2006). The first level is one of individual 
obligation, which includes to follow consigns and basic rules, such as wearing the 
mandatory individual protections. Obedience is a must, along with the notion of self 
protection and, in some cases, that of survival. In most settings and most of the time, 
this level of obligation can appear disconnected from the apparent requirements of 
tasks. However, during accident and crisis situations, this basic level plays its full role 
and it is expected to be automatically integrated in behaviors. 
Another level is that of economic obligation; simple economic rationality favors 
investments in prevention so as to avoid the very high direct and indirect costs of 
accidents. This level is most often disregarded during accident and crisis, as urgency 
prevails and exceptional expenditures may be undertaken.  
A managerial obligation resides in the fact that safety figures among collective 
performance factors and must be managed to that effect, in itself and alongside other 
performance factors with which it is in interaction. During accidents or crisis, this 
managerial coordination of decisions is likely to be crucial. 
The legal obligation refers to the existence of the organization within a state of law, 
applied to all organizations which have to conform with established norms and 
prescriptions. Often this level prevails in the organization when safety is considered; 
i.e., safety actions and investments may be framed as responses to minimum legal 
requirements. However, during accident and crisis situations, the need to invent creative 
fixes may make that level less predominant. 
Safety experts' best possible application of scientific and technical knowledge 
corresponds to the professional level of obligation. In some contexts all members of the 
organization are invited to integrate safety within their professional identity.  
Interdependency and solidarity exist de facto within working relationships and make 
each of us responsible for others' safety. This corresponds to the reciprocity obligation, 
which can extend to relations with the environment of the organization and its 
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 protection. The moral obligation puts forward the value of human life, primordial within 
our cultural ethics, and for which better safety for all is a goal. 
These professional, reciprocal and moral obligations can play their role during a crisis 
situation and contribute to organizational resilience – if they have been nurtured before. 
These levels of obligation influence perceptions at all levels of the organization and 
thereby influence safety practices. They are also known to outside actors and 
stakeholders, who may view them differently from those inside the organization. As 
shown above, obligations change in meaning and salience according to whether the 
organization is in a normal or crisis situation. It is thus useful in each context to assess 
safety obligation levels, both in ordinary times and for accident or crisis situations. This 
is what is done during the simulation exercises we study. The bridge built between these 
two different instants in organizational life can contribute to resilience. 
2.3 Interpretations of simulations 
In the usual way of organizing exercises, one uses a rational model to measure the gaps 
between prescribed and observed actions as the scenario unfolds, and to explain in an 
objective way the causes of those deviations. This approach can be called “naïve”, as it 
doesn’t reach the complexity of the organization during emergencies and crisis. It can 
be associated with a “simple-loop learning”: measuring gaps and controlling them by 
known actions. 
In this paper, we present a method to observe an organization during a simulation based 
on the plurality of specialized observers’ points of view. Taking their observations 
together allows us to address the complexity of organizational behavior, to generate 
meaning and learning from the post-simulation analysis and thereby go beyond the 
simple diagnosis of deviations from standard practice. The method is framed by a three 
dimensional model of organization: structures, relations and meaning: 
“that of structures in which actors’ games take place, that of relations between actors 
who set structures in motion, changing them through their games, giving rise to new 
organisational forms. This dimension also takes into account the principles of (sense 
making) legitimacy through which actors justify their games and their constructed 
orders.” (Jacques and Specht, 2006, pp. 23) 
 
Structures consist in what is prescribed by the organization, objectivable and 
measurable: the product of division of work, tasks, the means to achieve tasks, formal 
rules, procedures, technology, coordination tools, etc.; what Minsberg (1993) calls the 
hierarchy line, technostructure and support services.  
Relations are often represented as the roles played by the different actors. Following 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977), this dimension takes into account the fact that the 
structure is a context for action,  which includes relations among people. Each actor 
provides his resources, stakes, interests and power. This dimension can be observed at 
the micro/local level. It concerns verbal and non verbal, formal and non formal 
communication. It raises questions about the group’s dynamics. 
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 Sense making is what people use to justify their actions; it is related to the notions of 
legitimacy, ethics, interests and values. The actor’s representation of the situation 
influences his behavior. People belonging to different “worlds” have difficulties to act 
together for a common task (Boltansky and Thevenot, 1991), (Weick 1992).  
3. ORGANIZATION OF SIMULATION EXERCISES 
In order to be prepared for emergency management activities, risk-prone companies and 
rescue services organize on a regular basis exercises that simulate accidents and 
catastrophes. The purpose of such exercises is to train people to apply procedures and 
plans, to become familiar with technical systems and locations, and to evaluate the 
efficiency and appropriateness of procedures. These practical sessions have one more 
advantage: they can be organized more frequently than staff turns over. 
In this way, teams become accustomed to work together and if some need for 
improvement is identified, progress can be assessed during the next exercise, as it will 
be carried out by the same people in comparable conditions. This advantage is 
especially great when the exercise concerns very rare events and/or when the 
stakeholders have a high rate of turn-over. By running exercises at an appropriate 
frequency, the organization increases its robustness in the face of “known events”. 
3.1 Prevention of crisis: the role of simulations 
When dealing with the management of crisis situations, the interest of exercises in terms 
of training can be questioned. Crises are situations in which plans and procedures are 
not appropriate, so how exercises can provide experience for such situations? How may 
exercises increase the resilience of organizations? 
By placing observers in appropriate locations with precise missions during emergency 
exercises, it can be observed that people playing their roles in the exercise go beyond 
the procedures describing their tasks: they develop communication and coordination 
activities with other people (inside and outside their organization) and they adapt their 
activity to the real context in which they are. If the debriefing of the exercise is focused 
on the strict application of plans and procedures, such deviations and extensions are 
evaluated negatively or hidden by the participants. 
“Given the emphasis on plans, even those that are impossible to execute, it is not 
surprising that departing from them is often cited as evidence of a failure. Disasters, 
however, break the rules that guide the ordinary conduct of business and government, 
at least for a period of time. Disasters create new environments that must be explored, 
assessed, and comprehended, change the physical and social landscape, and therefore 
require a period of exploration, learning, and the development of new approaches”, 
(Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003) 
These deviations from the standard procedures are indicators of the ability of people to 
adapt to difficulties and by that, they reveal on one hand the need for adaptation of 
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 procedures and on the other hand the resilience capacities of the organization: the ability 
of people to avoid destabilization and entry into a crisis.  
3.2 Observation of exercises  
Based on this analysis, the introduction of specialized observers was tested in several 
exercises, in order to identify these deviations from the prescribed world and to be able 
to get the full picture of the organization at work, from the combination of the points of 
view of the participants and the points of view of the different observers. Three kinds of 
observers were defined: those who observe the activity of key people (information they 
receive and emit, people with whom they collaborate, decisions they make, etc.), those 
who observe a specific task (how it is achieved, difficulties encountered, who 
participates, what resources are used, etc.) and those who observe a specific place (who 
is there, what is done, how this place is perceived by people, etc.). 
Using this combination of points of view (people playing roles and specialized 
observers) during the debriefing session, a number of deviations have been identified, in 
particular the emergence of organizational patterns and communication flows among 
stakeholders, some of them proving efficient to prevent the situation from turning into 
crisis. Studying the character and value of these deviations makes it possible to 
capitalize on them to improve emergency procedures and plans (double-loop learning), 
and to increase the mutual knowledge and efficient cooperation of stakeholders (Wybo, 
2006). 
“The reliability of learning of an organization is if it develops common understandings 
of its experience and makes its interpretation public, stable and shared.” (March & al., 
1991) 
On the other side, it is also possible to observe and understand some drawbacks that 
would ruin the efficiency of emergency management in a real situation. In the 
simulation of an accident in a road tunnel, two observers were placed in the control 
room of the tunnel: one observing the manager on duty and the other observing the 
activity in the control room. At the same time, other observers were inside and outside 
the tunnel. When the simulated accident occurred, some of the car passengers were 
wandering on foot in the tunnel, looking for an emergency exit, and the rescue services 
took a long time to localize and shelter them. 
By combining observers’ data, we identified the organizational cause of this difficulty. 
The control room operator was facing a set of video screens in which it was possible to 
observe these people wandering in the tunnel. At the same time, in a corner of the room, 
the rescue services had established a radio terminal to communicate with their 
colleagues in the tunnel and they were listening to the conversations over the radio. 
Finally, the manager on duty was trying to assess the situation and to answer the 
requests that he was receiving. 
But the operator had not been told to report to the manager what he saw on the videos 
(he was trained to answer questions) and the rescue officer managing the radio terminal 
was not trained to identify problems that his colleagues encountered in their actions 
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 from what he heard over the radio, so none of them communicated to each other or to 
the manager. 
When the analysis of the different observations (in the control room, in the tunnel, at the 
rescue headquarters, etc.) was carried out, this drawback appeared along with other 
negative and positive reactions and it was possible for the tunnel managers to share 
these observations with their staff and to set up improved emergency procedures that 
make sense for everyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Simulations are one of the most efficient tools that can be used to train people to 
emergency situations, especially for situations with a low frequency of occurrence and a 
high potential of damage. Emergency services and risk-prone companies have gained 
significant experience in the setting up of exercises and this practice contributes to the 
robustness of their organizations to face “planned” emergencies. 
In order to face situations that may turn into crisis, because of surprise, speed of 
development, lack of resources or difficulties in communications among stakeholders, 
organizations need to assess and develop their resilience capacities. In this paper we 
have shown that exercises can contribute to that on the condition that their analysis goes 
beyond naïve interpretations and gives access to the complexity of organizational 
behavior. 
The method presented here provides means to reach this objective with only minor 
changes in the simulation set up. By defining specific missions for observers based on a 
model of organizational behavior, it is possible to identify more precisely the 
organization's resilience capacities and handicaps. 
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